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1. Epistemic	and	practical	reasons	are	of	a	kind.	2. RA	provides	the	only	plausible	account	of	reasons	according	to	which	(1)	is	so.	3. Therefore,	RA	is	true	(inference	to	the	best	explanation).		This	argument	clearly	makes	use	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	as	a	premise	in	order	to	establish	a	conclusion	about	the	metaphysics	of	theoretical	and	practical	normativity.	(The	Similarity	Hypothesis	is,	of	course,	premise	1).		Example	2:	Parfit		We	find	another	nice	example	in	Derek	Parfit’s	critical	discussion	of	a	view	that	he	calls	‘Metaphysical	Naturalism’.	This	is	the	view	that	normative	facts	are	natural	facts.	Parfit’s	discussion	of	this	view	is	almost	entirely	focused	on	
practical	reasons.	In	concluding	the	section,	however,	Parfit	writes:			 “If	Metaphysical	Naturalism	were	true,	we	could	not	have	reasons	to	have	particular	beliefs.	Such	epistemic	reasons	are	also	irreducibly	normative….	So	it	could	not	be	true	that	we	ought	to	accept	Naturalism,	nor	could	we	have	any	reasons	to	accept	this	view.”	(2011,	pp.110).		What’s	really	going	on	here	is	that	Parfit	is	using	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	to	reject	a	naturalistic	view	practical	reasons.	He	is	effectively	arguing	as	follows:		 1. If	metaphysical	naturalism	is	true	about	practical	reasons,	then	it	is	true	about	epistemic	reasons.	2. If	it	is	true	about	epistemic	reasons,	then	we	would	not	have	any	reason	to	believe	it	to	be	true.	3. So,	metaphysical	naturalism	is	not	true	about	practical	reasons.		We	may	or	may	not	think	that	this	as	a	very	good	argument.	But	that’s	not	what	really	matters	here.	What	really	matters	is	that	it	is	another	instance	in	which	the	
first	premise	-	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	–	is	being	used	to	draw	a	big	picture	metaphysical	conclusion.			Example	3:	Smith		In	the	most	recent	articulation	of	his	view,	Michael	Smith	argues	for	a	particular	view	of	reasons	for	intentional	action;	roughly,	the	view	that	reasons	for	action	are	properly	analysed	as	reasons	for	believing	something	to	be	desirable.	His	argument	is	the	following:		 1. The	concept	of	a	reason	for	belief	is	analyzable	in	non-normative	terms	(i.e.	in	terms	of	probability	and	evidence).	2. So,	if	the	concept	of	a	reason	for	desire	or	action	were	unanalyzable	then	“the	concept	of	a	reason	would	be	a	ragbag”	(2017,	pp.102).	3. The	concept	of	a	reason	is	not	a	ragbag.	4. The	concept	of	a	reason	for	desire	or	action	is	analysable.		This	is	also	an	argument	in	which	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	figures	as	a	premise	–	in	this	case	premise	3.	Smith	is	arguing	from	the	fact	that	the	concept	of	a	reasons	for	belief	and	a	reason	for	intentional	action	are,	in	some	important	sense,	the	same	kind	of	thing,	to	a	conclusion	about	the	metaphysics	of	reasons	for	action	(roughly,	analytical	reductionism).	Although	couched	in	terms	of	the	similarity	of	concepts	(rather	than	properties),	this	is,	I	think,	nevertheless	recognisable	as	an	appeal	to	a	version	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.			Example	4:	Cuneo		Finally,	consider	Terence	Cuneo’s	recent	use	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.	Cuneo	has	argued	for	the	more	focused	view	that	moral	normativity	and	epistemic	normativity	are,	at	the	metaphysical	level,	the	same	kind	of	thing.	And	he	has	used	this	as	part	of	an	argument	for	moral	realism.	His	‘master	argument’	is	as	follows	(2007,	6):		























(1) Because	belief	has	a	substantial	constitutive	aim,	theoretical	reason	is	responsible	to	‘an	external	standard	(truth)	that	logically	closes	sensible	deliberation’.		(2) Because	desire	doesn’t	have	a	substantial	constitutive	aim,	practical	reason	is	not	responsible	to	such	a	standard.		 (3) Given	that	–	from	(2)	-	practical	reason	is	not	responsible	to	such	a	standard,	it	must	be	grounded	in	‘the	norms	of	free	practical	reason’.		 (4) By	contrast,	given	that	–	from	(1)	-	theoretical	reason	is	responsible	to	such	a	standard,	it	is	not	grounded	in	‘norms	of	free	theoretical	reason’.		I	hope	that	this	is	an	accurate	rendering	of	Darwall’s	argument.	Given	my	own	aims	in	this	paper,	I	am	interested	to	see	whether	it	could	be	used	to	support	the	further	claims:			 (5) 	From	(3)	and	(4),	the	grounds	of	practical	reason	and	theoretical	reason	are	of	fundamentally	different	kinds.		 (6) So	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	is	right	and	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	is	wrong.		In	the	remainder	of	this	paper	I	will	try	to	find	out	whether	this	is	a	good	argument.	Before	doing	this	it	is	worth	noting	that	–	although	I’ll	focus	on	Darwall’s	argument	-	this	kind	of	argument	isn’t	unique	to	Darwall.	I	think	that	we	find	a	very	similar	thought	in	Hallvard	Lillehammer’s	brief	discussion	of	the	prospects	for	drawing	an	analogy	between	‘epistemology’	and	‘ethics’.	Sceptical	of	this	analogy,	Lillehammer	writes:		 “While	arguments	in	epistemology	often	have	the	pre-theoretical	appearance	of	being	at	least	partly	controlled	by	some	conception	of	an	external	aim	or	function	usually	described	in	terms	of	concepts	such	as	‘truth’	or	‘knowledge’,	
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